

U.N. Security Council's legitimacy as an authoritative body in international law if the United States acts unilaterally. If the argument for involvement in Iraq is that we lead by example, then we signal to the rest of the world that it is okay to ignore the concerns voiced by the international community. This will only lead to further future conflict. If the United Nations is to impose sanctions, restore order, and be an effective international institution, it must have the respect and cooperation of the most powerful country in the world.

Rather than initiating a war with Iraq, let's make an effort to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. INSLEE).

(Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. INSLEE. Mr. Speaker, America is a great Nation because it always at times of toil and tumble has followed great principles.

We have always matched the might of our Armed Forces with the force of our great principles, and it is a great American principle that at times of international trouble, we work with the international community, not without it. It is a great American principle that we do not launch unilateral first strikes without the support of the international community and the vote of the U.S. Congress.

The Spratt resolution follows and upholds those great American principles, and the underlying resolution violates them. No Congress should give any President a blank check to start a unilateral first strike for any reason, anytime, with or without any allies.

This Nation gave the world the great principles of freedom of speech and freedom of religion and ought to lead the Nation in the concept of going forward on the arc of human history which is working together for mutual security rather than backwards to the law of the jungle.

I do not want to vote to make it the legacy of this generation of American leaders to send us backwards where a strong nation devours the weak, and we do not work with the international community.

There is a practical reason for doing this. As General Hoar, or Zinni, I cannot remember which one, said, why would we supercharge Osama bin Laden's recruiting efforts with a unilateral first strike?

The Spratt resolution imbues great American principles. We should follow it is the American way.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. LARSON).

(Mr. LARSON of Connecticut asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)

Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I rise to unite this body and the Nation behind the Spratt resolution of which I am a proud cosponsor.

The Spratt resolution both strengthens the President's hand and demonstrates national resolve. It preserves the constitutional authority that resides with this Congress and does not abdicate our role to the United Nations.

Many have stepped forward, including many notable Republicans, Mr. Scowcroft, Mr. Eagleburger, Mr. Baker, and several others, who understand the deep importance and abiding concern that many of us on this aisle share with not only them, but people all across this Nation.

Thomas Friedman spoke at a recent book tour about the consequences of our doctrine, long term, and its effect, and he was struck by the one man in the audience who came up to him and reached into his wallet and produced but a picture of his children. It spoke volumes. We need say nothing else.

Support the Spratt alternative.

DICK CHENEY'S SONG OF AMERICA

(By David Armstrong)

Few writers are more ambitious than the writers of government policy papers, and few policy papers are more ambitious than Dick Cheney's masterwork. It has taken several forms over the last decade and is in fact the product of several ghostwriters (notably Paul Wolfowitz and Colin Powell), but Cheney has been consistent in his dedication to the ideas in the documents that bear his name, and he has maintained a close association with the ideologues behind them. Let us, therefore, call Cheney the author, and this series of documents the Plan.

The Plan was published in unclassified form most recently under the title of Defense Strategy for the 1990s, as Cheney ended his term as secretary of defense under the elder George Bush in early 1993, but it is, like "Leaves of Grass," a perpetually evolving work. It was the controversial Defense Planning Guidance draft of 1992—from which Cheney, unconvincingly, tried to distance himself—and it was the somewhat less aggressive revised draft of that same year. This June it was a presidential lecture in the form of a commencement address at West Point, and in July it was leaked to the press as yet another Defense Planning Guidance (this time under the pen name of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld). It will take its ultimate form, though, as America's new national security strategy—and Cheney et al. will experience what few writers have even dared dream: their words will become our reality.

The Plan is for the United States to rule the world. The overt theme is unilateralism, but it is ultimately a story of domination. It calls for the United States to maintain its overwhelming military superiority and prevent new rivals from rising up to challenge it on the world stage. It calls for dominion over friends and enemies alike. It says not that the United States must be more powerful, or most powerful, but that it must be absolutely powerful.

The Plan is disturbing in many ways, and ultimately unworkable. Yet it is being sold now as an answer to the "new realities" of the post-September 11 world, even as it was sold previously as the answer to the new realities of the post-Cold War world. For Cheney, the Plan has always been the right answer, no matter how different the questions.

Cheney's unwavering adherence to the Plan would be amusing, and maybe a little sad, except that it is now our plan. In its pages are the ideas that we now act upon

every day with the full might of the United States military. Strangely, few critics have noted that Cheney's work has a long history, or that it was once quite unpopular, or that it was created in reaction to circumstances that are far removed from the ones we now face. But Cheney is a well-known action man. One has to admire, in a way, the Babe Ruth-like sureness of his political work. He pointed to center field ten years ago, and now the ball is sailing over the fence.

Before the Plan was about domination it was about money. It took shape in late 1989, when the Soviet threat was clearly on the decline, and, with it, public support for a large military establishment. Cheney seemed unable to come to terms with either new reality. He remained deeply suspicious of the Soviets and strongly resisted all efforts to reduce military spending. Democrats in Congress jeered his lack of strategic vision, and a few within the Bush Administration were whispering that Cheney had become an irrelevant factor in structuring a response to the revolutionary changes taking place in the world.

More adaptable was the up-and-coming General Colin Powell, the newly appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Ronald Reagan's national security adviser, Powell had seen the changes taking place in the Soviet Union firsthand and was convinced that the ongoing transformation was irreversible. Like Cheney, he wanted to avoid military cuts, but he knew they were inevitable. The best he could do was minimize them, and the best way to do that would be to offer a new security structure that would preserve American military capabilities despite reduced resources.

Powell and his staff believed that a weakened Soviet Union would result in shifting alliances and regional conflict. The United States was the only nation capable of managing the forces at play in the world; it would have to remain the preeminent military power in order to ensure the peace and shape the emerging order in accordance with American interests. U.S. military strategy, therefore, would have to shift from global containment to managing less-well-defined regional struggles and unforeseen contingencies. To do this, the United States would have to project a military "forward presence" around the world; there would be fewer troops but in more places. This plan still would not be cheap, but through careful restructuring and superior technology, the job could be done with 25 percent fewer troops. Powell insisted that maintaining superpower status must be the first priority of the U.S. military. "We have to put a shingle outside our door saying, 'Superpower Lives Here,' no matter what the Soviets do," he said at the time. He also insisted that the troop levels be proposed were the bare minimum necessary to do so. This concept would come to be known as the "Base Force."

Powell's work on the subject proved timely. The Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989, and five days later Powell had his new strategy ready to present to Cheney. Even as decades of repression were ending in Eastern Europe, however, Cheney still could not abide even the force and budget reductions Powell proposed. Yet he knew that cuts were unavoidable. Having no alternative of his own to offer, therefore, he reluctantly encouraged Powell to present his ideas to the president. Powell did so the next day; Bush made no promises but encouraged him to keep at it.

Less encouraging was the reaction of Paul Wolfowitz, the undersecretary of defense for policy. A lifelong proponent of the unilateralist, maximum-force approach, he shared Cheney's skepticism about the Eastern Bloc and so put his own staff to work on